KENSINGTON AND Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation’s (KCTMO’s) Peter Maddison said he ‘never discussed’ related cladding issues at meetings discussing the Lakanal House fire.
The inquiry resumed on 7 September, and its first day saw Rydon’s commercial manager state it ‘struggled’ to find cladding specialists for the refurbishment. After that, Harley Facades’ owner Ray Bailey said he did not know Celotex insulation was flammable, and accused that company of ‘misleading’ his firm.
It was then revealed that his 25 year old son Ben was hired to project manage; other Harley staff testified that no technical manager was in place that was qualified to advise on fire performance, and an estimating error was made about cladding costs. Then, its former design manager revealed that emails, documents and drawings relating to the refurbishment ‘appear to have been lost forever’ after a laptop was wiped.
The inquiry was then told ‘nobody’ at Harley ‘was designated with the responsibility of assessing the fire safety of products used’, alongside revelations about lack of experience, cost issues and competence. Ben Bailey revealed that the insulation used was sold ‘at almost 50% discount’, and then gave further evidence alongside cladding fabricator CEP’s senior sales manager Geof Blades.
It was revealed at the end of September that the insulation was ‘originally suggested’ to meet an ‘aspirational’ thermal efficiency target, but without any ‘basic checks’ regarding fire performance. In October, Harley’s project manager admitted he had not understood a warning about cavity barriers; one of the fabricators denied recommending the aluminium composite material (ACM) used; and other issues were raised.
Recently, representatives of cladding subcontractor Osborne Berry agreed its work on the project was ‘shocking’ and ‘unacceptable’, while another denied having a ‘lack of respect’ for residents. Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea’s (RBKC’s) building control officer and his manager at the time, were questioned, before the council and Rydon were criticised in Artelia’s evidence.
Artelia staff discussed how KCTMO had ‘struggled with design issues’, and chances they missed to help prevent the fatal fire; and had warned it that the refurbishment ‘would fail’ unless there was a ‘fundamental review’ of its scope, while resident issues and surveys were explored. Earlier this month, Studio E were ‘not asked’ about their experience of high rise residential cladding pre appointment, while KCTMO’s value engineering was denied to be ‘cost cutting’.
More recently the government appointed Ali Akbor to the inquiry panel, while further KCTMO evidence was heard, including that it held a ‘secret’ meeting with Rydon to cut costs; its project manager ‘threw away’ most of her hand written records when she left in 2018; and it was said to have been ‘frustrated’ with Rydon’s progress.
BD Online reported on the first evidence from KCTMO’s former director of assets and regeneration Peter Maddison, in which it was revealed he ‘attended briefings’ relating to the 2009 Lakanal House fire that ‘covered lessons to be learned’, but ‘had no discussions’ on this in relation to Grenfell. These were meetings organised by KCTMO relating to health and safety, and specifically ‘discussed lessons to be learned’ from Lakanal.
He confirmed he was present at the sessions, one of which took place ‘just three months before’ the Grenfell fire, and covered Southwark Council’s prosecution over breaches of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 [FSO], the news outlet noting that issues at Lakanal included ‘new cladding that was not fire retardant’ during a refurbishment, and that the coroner overseeing that inquest called on the government to require the retrofitting of sprinklers in high rise residential buildings.
‘Greater clarity’ was also called for on advice for work ‘that could reduce the safety of buildings’, with inquiry counsel Richard Millett reading from the minutes of the 2017 meeting, confirming that Lakanal House was discussed - ‘it was noted we were compliant with the offences for which Southwark was prosecuted’.
Mr Millett asked Mr Maddison if he remembered ‘to what extent’ the meeting reviewed KCTMO’s systems and arrangements for complying with the FSO, and he responded ‘I’m afraid I don’t’. He was then asked if he knew the basis for the note that KCTMO was ‘compliant’ with regulations that Southwark Council was prosecuted for breaching, to which he also said ‘I’m sorry, I don’t’, and added that he did not know who would have been responsible for it.
Continuing his questioning, Mr Millett asked if Mr Maddison had ‘drawn any connection’ between Lakanal and Grenfell’s refurbishment, to which he said ‘no’; asked if he had ‘any recollection’ of questions as to combustibility of the cladding used on Grenfell ‘being discussed with him, in particular in the context of the Lakanal House fire’, he commented ‘no, not specifically’.
This, BD Online noted, came in contrast to his then colleagues Claire Williams and David Gibson, who both claimed to have had ‘Lakanal House-inspired conversations’ about the safety of cladding and insulation with Rydon, though ‘neither explicitly said they had such conversations with [Mr] Maddison’.
Asked what conversations had been prompted about sprinklers by the Lakanal coroner’s recommendations, Mr Maddison said that part of the work he began after joining KCTMO in 2013 was to put an ‘asset-management strategy in place to set parameters’ for investing in housing. He added: ‘We were in dialogue with the council about the level of investment needed and what the priorities were.
‘At that time, we were looking at ensuring the passive elements of fire safety were in operation. Particularly on Grenfell the [automatic opening vent] there was beyond economic repair, so the priority was to make sure that what was there was put back in working order. There wasn’t consideration, as I can remember, in relation to fitting sprinklers.’
Later, he was asked if he was ‘satisfied’ that due diligence had been carried out in appointing contractors and consultants, to which he answered: ‘I was only involved with the due diligence in relation to the main contractor [Rydon]. I didn’t have sight of what due diligence was carried out in relation to the consultants.’
Mr Millett asked him what research he had undertaken on consultants ‘already engaged’ on the project when he joined in 2013, specifically Studio E, and Mr Maddison responded that the project was ‘already at RIBA Stage D’, but had ‘stalled’, and ‘the only work that was carried out at that stage was to take the project from Stage D to Stage E, so it was quite a limited amount of work. I didn’t have any cause […] I took at face value that the due diligence had been carried out before I arrived.’
In his written evidence, Mr Maddison said KCTMO and RBKC had appointed Studio E and Artelia as they had been working on the neighbouring school and leisure centre (KALC) – Mr Millett asked him if he had been aware Studio E was appointed to KALC due to ‘their specialist skills with schools and leisure centres’, and ‘had no experience’ of high rise residential projects. He said he had ‘not been aware of that information’, but ‘had no reason not to have confidence’ in them.
He added that ‘my experience with Studio E was that they were delivering a complex and large programme right next to Grenfell Tower and it was overclad. So I’d expect that they would have had a degree of understanding of the complexity of that sort of project’. On the evidence he had provided in the form of five diaries and eight day books, Mr Millett said these ‘plainly contain material of the utmost relevance’.
Mr Millett also warned that both Mr Maddison and KCTMO’s legal advisors Kennedys were ‘going to have to give clear and convincing explanations of why these documents were not disclosed to the inquiry – and so far as we can tell to the Metropolitan Police – until now’. He added that Mr Maddison would be questioned about these at ‘the end of his evidence’, but might still be questioned about information within them before that.