PHILIP CLARK, former burn hall manager at the Building Research Establishment (BRE), denied knowing about ‘undeclared’ fire resistant boards on a ‘critical’ test of Celotex insulation pre Grenfell.
At the inquiry last November, Celotex’s former assistant product manager Jonathan Roper admitted that the company had been ‘dishonest’ and made ‘misleading’ claims by ‘rigging a fire test’, and had done so by ‘over-engineering’ a cladding fire safety test so that its insulation product could pass.
He had worked on two fire tests on the insulation and subsequent sales plans, with the first test – in February 2014 – failing within 26 minutes at BRE. Mr Roper claimed that Mr Clarke suggested the test had failed due to non combustible cladding panels cracking in front of it, and that a thicker panel would ‘achieve a pass’.
That test saw flames ‘engulfing the rig’, but after changing some of the materials used around the insulation, including ‘adding concealed fire-retardant panels’, a second test in May that year passed, ‘and was used to market the foam boards as safe for high-rise buildings’.
The ‘overengineering’ of the second test saw Celotex add a 6mm fire resisting magnesium oxide board to the cladding test right made of 12mm thick fibre cement panels, with 8mm fibre cement panels added over the magnesium oxide to ‘conceal’ its presence, ‘making the whole system almost flush – but for the 2mm difference’ – with the magnesium oxide added ‘with the express knowledge of senior managers’.
He agreed that the decision to use a ‘thinner layer was to make it less noticeable there was something behind it’, which would help ‘see off any prospect of anyone asking questions’, and was ‘fully aware’ that the test was being ‘overengineered to achieve a pass’. Mr Roper also was ‘not in any doubt’ that Mr Clarke was aware of the plan to include the magnesium oxide.
Mr Roper was asked to produce slides for the company’s sales team and senior management to explain the testing process, which he was later told ‘would not include’ mention of the failed test or the addition of fire resistant materials to the second test. He admitted that the presentation was ‘downright misleading’ and ‘intended to mislead’, as well as that the company had behaved in a ‘completely unethical’ way.
When published, the BRE test report meanwhile ‘contained no reference’ to the magnesium oxide boards, with Mr Roper claiming that Mr Clarke ‘decided they did not have a major impact on the test result so omitted them’. Inside Housing has now reported on Mr Clark’s evidence at the inquiry, in which he ‘denied any knowledge’ of the ‘presence of undeclared fire resisting boards’ in the Celotex test.
The news outlet noted that the test ‘would later become a crucial part’ of the company’s claims that the RS500 product was suitable for high rises, and Mr Clark insisted having no knowledge that the boards had been included, adding that he would have ‘stopped the test’ had he known. Delivery notes for the materials used were shown to the inquiry, and there was no documentation for the boards in these.
Asked about this, Mr Clark said that this occasionally happened, putting it down to ‘people being people’ and not wanting to ‘upset delivery drivers by insisting on documentation’, with materials thus just delivered straight to the testing hall. He accepted that as the rig was assembled by contractors for Celotex, ‘if someone was going out of their way to deceive’ there was a chance they could alter the rig in a way that BRE was unaware of.
He was then shown a checklist of steps to go through for a cladding test, which included receiving specifications from the client and checking material samples used, but this ‘was never completed’ for the test in question. Inquiry counsel Richard Millett asked ‘what was the point of having a detailed standard operating procedure such as this […] which you didn’t use’, to which Mr Clarke replied the steps were ‘more of an aide memoir’ as to what to do.
In turn, BRE was revealed to have not received drawings of the planned test rig, Mr Clark stating that this ‘wasn’t unusual’ and had happened in this case because the test was similar to a previous one Celotex had failed, ‘only with a thicker cladding board used’. Inquiry chair Sir Martin Moore-Bick then asked ‘wasn’t it essential for the BRE to know the composition of the system being tested?’.
In response, Mr Clark said: ‘I understand your question and the answer is from checking the delivery notes and checking and measuring on site. It wasn’t common practice to insist on having them [drawings] before the test, maybe it should have been, but it wasn’t.’
He also noted that he had been away on a first aid course when the rig was constructed, and ‘could not explain’ why his deputy had not noticed the additional fire boards being installed, only stating that the rig was ‘checked at certain specific times’ by BRE. The photographs of the boards within the test, Mr Clark added, ‘were taken from height’ – and with the boards 8m above ground, they ‘would not have been visible from’ his vantage point at ground level.
Mr Millett commented that ‘this is quite an incredible list of omissions and missed instances isn’t it’, to which Mr Clark said ‘yes, I probably agree with you’. Mr Millett then asked ‘isn’t the reality that you knew very well that there was a 6mm magnesium oxide layer behind it, you were in charge of this test, the photographs showed it was there, the deputy knew it was there as it must have taken time to put up and it was covered over by a perfectly obvious ruby coloured band in two different places by a material of different thicknesses. Surely you should have known what was behind it?’
In response, Mr Clark said ‘no, I would have reported it and had I known about it I would have stopped the test’. Video footage was shown of Mr Clark telling Celotex staff that the February 2014 test had ‘likely failed’ due to cladding distorting and pulling away to make cavity barriers ineffective, and he was recorded saying he had ‘seen worse failures’.
He then denied under questioning that ‘this constituted offering advice’ to the company, and accused Mr Roper ‘of lying’ that Mr Clark had advised thickening the panels. He was also asked whether BRE influenced the government ‘into adopting the test methodology as a route to getting cladding system[s] to comply with guidance for commercial reasons’, with the news outlet noting BRE had proposed the new methodology in 1999, two years after being privatised.
It was then ‘the only organisation with the facility to carry the tests out when it was first introduced into guidance’, and Mr Clark agreed that BRE had influenced the process because it was ‘the right thing to do’, and not commercially motivated. However, he accepted that current Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government civil servant Brian Martin had ‘been seconded’ from his role at BRE at the time to work ‘part time within government’ on the methodology.
Mr Millett asked ‘would it be fair from your knowledge to describe BS8414... as a joint project between government and BRE with Brian Martin on both sides?’; Mr Clark replied that this was ‘a fair assumption’. Mr Clarke had left his job at BRE in December 2017 having ‘been made a lucrative offer’ by a competitor, and a year later was employed by Kingspan, but was made redundant with ’10 minutes’ notice last June ‘shortly before’ details of its testing at BRE was made public by the inquiry.
He said he believed his departure ‘was linked’ to this, adding: ‘It’s not long after that happened that the information came out about what Kingspan were doing with regard to the falsification of tests, but I have got no substantive evidence, it’s just a feeling I had at the time.’