IT IS not in the nature of a competent manager to organise significant change in his company without a sophisticated management arrangement, to ensure that the process is working as expected. Change in the national process of managing fire safety in the UK is no different.
In recent years, we have seen a new regulatory system introduced in England and Wales, the lynchpins of which are the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005, the Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 2007 (CDM) and Regulation 16B of the Building Regulations.
This is a good system with fine intentions, but there are concerns that these different parts of the regulatory mesh are not working well together to raise the standard of installation of appropriate fire protection measures.
In fact, as this system continues to ‘bed in’ over the next few years, there are fears regarding the continued stability in the safety process and that it may not be consistent with the record of the previous regulatory arrangements. Perhaps the biggest challenges for the fire protection industry in this uncertain period are apathy, ignorance and denial.
Lakanal and wider issues
Both the current government and all political parties have stated that – unlike the environment – fire has no priority on the political agenda. Of course, all politicians will come out with sound bites calling for action, or call for an inquiry following the tragedy of a major fire. But when the dust settles, is there really any action that manifests itself into tangible reality?
We all recall the tragic fire at the Lakanal House residential tower block in Camberwell, south London, in July 2009, in which six people lost their lives. At the time, the media asked the obvious question: ‘How could this happen?’ More appropriately perhaps, and in risk terms, we should be enquiring about the combination of events that led to such an outcome. Was Lakanal House a one off, or is it symptomatic of a much more deep-rooted problem? And are there other elements which contribute to a picture of worsening public fire protection in the UK?
A couple of sobering thoughts have emerged recently. Firstly, according to a BBC investigation in September, at least 300 social housing high-rise blocks in London had no valid fire check from their local authority which, in the words of the BBC, ‘was a criminal offence’. Lakanal House gained national media attention because people died. Only then were questions asked of local authorities, to ascertain their legal requirement to undertake fire risk assessment. A lot of people will view the BBCs exposé as merely the tip of the iceberg.
Second is the concern over the current increase in fire losses. The latest UK fire loss figures from the Association of British Insurers show fire damage up by some 16%, to £1.3bn – a record high. With regard to life loss figures, all the signs are that we will see a significant rise over the next year. Such a combination of factors should at least raise the question of why?
Structural protection
The value of sprinkler systems in certain circumstances cannot be denied, but many protection arrangements are based upon compartmentation and other passive systems, and the fact that, if fire breaks out, the fabric and structure of any given building is designed to behave in a certain way. This expectation is not just to keep people safe while they are in the building when a fire is in progress, but also to enable them to leave and, not least, for firefighters who have to enter in such circumstances.
In 2001, the Association for Specialist Fire Protection (ASFP) took part in a detailed three-year Partners in Innovation project, partly funded by the then Office of the Deputy Prime Minister and the Department of Trade and Industry, where independent research was collected on fire safety provisions in a wide variety of nominated types of buildings.
The research repeatedly showed that the reliability of fire compartment walls and barriers was a real problem.
In some complex buildings, detailed drawings were missing, and occupants had no knowledge of the location of essential defences, such as compartment walls. A high percentage of compartment walls were either defective, through poorly installed fire stopping of penetrating service systems, or invalidated by incompetent maintenance.
The findings were supplied to government as an official report and led directly to the publication of the ASFP guidance, Ensuring best practice for passive fire protection in buildings (available from www.asfp.org.uk). While the full report into the fire at Lakanal House is yet to be published, we are left to wonder whether many of the findings relating to the way in which the fire spread were predicted in the Partners in Innovation report.
Much has been made in recent times of the fact that disasters such as Lakanal House could have been avoided by much tighter Building Regulations. However, it is arguably just as true to say that, if appropriate fire protection measures were installed correctly, in accordance with the Approved Document B guidance to current Building Regulations, then both the human and financial cost would be considerably lessened. Which moves this discussion from the issue of apathy, to that of ignorance.
Ignorance and information
Ignorance can manifest itself in one of two ways; either as a lack of knowledge, or worse, as a wilful neglect or refusal to acquire knowledge to which one should be duty bound.
One of the ASFP’s core objectives is to ensure that the information necessary to determine appropriate built-in fire protection measures is made freely available to all. To this end, over the last year considerable strides have been made to increase this knowledge base – and meet the demand for guidance and information – through the revision of a number of established documents and the introduction of new guides, such as the revised ASFP ‘Red Book’ dealing with fire stopping.
It might be argued – and it is certainly the view of many – that the demise of the clerk of works is symptomatic of how, piece by piece, we have stripped away our systems to deliver excellence of works in buildings, only made worse by the introduction of competitive bidding between local authorities and approved inspector bodies.
All too often, when deficiencies come to light, one can expect to hear the retort, ‘well, building control has passed it off’, even though the intent of building control is to check designs against regulations, and not to carry out detailed checks on installed works. That is squarely the duty of the person carrying out the work (who, often contrary to what he may think, can be prosecuted).
So, is local or national government doing anything about this issue? There is no doubt that government clearly expects that the duties of Building Regulation 16B will be reliably carried out. This Regulation requires the responsible person for the building, such as the owner, to be fully informed about the fire protection provisions, to assist with the preparation of risk assessments under the Fire Safety Order, and that these assumed provisions will still apply after 20 years or more. Furthermore, subsequent fire risk assessments will ensure that this continues to happen – or will they?
If the evidence placed in front of many ASFP members who witness malpractice or inadequate passive fire protection on an almost daily basis is anything to go by, then the courts should be overflowing. The journey from the architect’s initial design to the occupancy by the building owner or tenant is one loaded with opportunity for error compounded on error.
With that in mind, it is worth re-emphasising a few risk-based points:
Risk point 1:
The architect specifies the requirement for and type of passive fire protection required to satisfy the regulatory needs for his building design.
Architects know that Regulation 16B is important, but these days they do not go, or are not allowed by the contract to go, onto the building site to check work.
If the building is to be designed using a fire engineering approach, then the required passive fire protection may already be calculated to a minimum.
Risk point 2:
Under a duty of care in accordance with current CDM Regulations, the main contractor must appoint a ‘competent’ installer to carry out the fire protection works.
Given that there is no legal requirement for him to appoint a third-party certificated installer, he may feel free to interpret ‘competency’ as he sees fit, based on the boundaries of his knowledge of fire protection or, as is often more likely the case, through reliance of the information given to him by the contractor he wishes to appoint.
In a market where price is everything, selective hearing on what is an appropriate solution may well prove to be the order of the day.
Risk point 3:
Often, defects are caused by mixed trade contracts where accountability is lacking, or when follow-on trades cause damage to the excellent work they inherit. Most frequently, the subsequent addition of new services – IT cables included – directly damage the fire stopping provisions originally provided.
Unless such damage is picked up and made good in a competent way, then the fire performance of the building will not be fit for purpose.
Risk point 4:
If the final building inspection process does not identify any failing in the passive fire protection measures (and remember that, at this stage, many such areas will be concealed from inspection) then, in accordance with Regulation 16B, the passive fire protection provision details will be passed onto the owner of the building as fit for purpose.
Risk point 5:
Under the Fire Safety Order, the owner of the building, as the ‘responsible person’, now takes on the ownership of liability for the fire safety of all those within his building, and will appoint a ‘competent person’ to ensure that an appropriate risk assessment is made and maintained for his building.
If he does not feel competent for this to be handled in house, he will seek external guidance. However, without appropriate knowledge, will he be in a position to judge the competency of those he decides to employ?
Risk point 6:
As matters stand at present, there are no qualifications required to become a risk assessor. Therefore, without the appropriate knowledge and observational skills, it is highly likely that deficient, inappropriate or missing passive fire protection measures will go undetected. This brings the discussion to the final suggested challenge – that of denial.
Respect and support
When you take delivery of a new car, do you give much thought to the process of manufacture, or how it was inspected before delivery? Would you ask yourself the questions, ‘I assume they put some brakes in it’, or ‘is this steering wheel connected correctly’, or ‘will my family be safe in this vehicle?’
The same thinking often applies to the fire protection measures installed in a building. However, it is simply not good enough to state that measures exist to ensure against incompetent workmanship, and that everyone will take ownership of their responsibilities, utilise properly qualified people and proper independent audits.
Ultimately, in this climate of financial constraint, where cost reduction is the order of the day, government will arguably find that, instead of imposing a cost burden on UK plc, as the business community may lead them to believe, the suggestions we are making will in fact reduce the overall and escalating cost of fire at no additional cost to the exchequer.
It is time for this industry to stop accepting lip service and to demand a little more respect and support in the objects and aspirations that we would like to see achieved for the benefit and safety of all concerned.
Finally, with an eye on the future, climate change is one issue that is high on everyone’s agenda. But to progress a path toward sustainable, zero carbon living is foolhardy if the types of construction created develop a significantly greater risk of fire. Take, for example, the recent major fire in Peckham, south London, where a partially constructed timber-framed building was not only completely destroyed but also caused the fire to spread to other occupied buildings (see FRM, January 2010, p.3).
Many in our industry will have seen the way in which the fire stopping process can be abused in such construction types; and this, coupled with the potential use of more combustible (but energy efficient) materials, could result in another environmental ‘time bomb’ legacy for future generations
Brian Robinson CBE, QFSM, FiFireE is president of the Association for Specialist Fire Protection and a former chief fire officer of London Fire Brigade